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Abstract 
The paper proposes a two-country general equilibrium model of endogenous growth and trade 
between two regions, North and South, with different environmental standards. Pollution is a by-
product of consumption and in order to abate it the northern region unilaterally imposes a green tax 
on consumption. As the tax affects domestic demand of consumer goods according to their 
pollution intensities, regardless of where those goods are produced, the model shows that such a 
unilateral environmental policy can increase the speed of technological change and pollution 
abatement in both regions. 
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The interaction between trade and environmental regulation has generated a large body of 
literature which, within classical static models of international trade, has mainly focused on the 
impact of environmental regulation on comparative advantages (Copeland and Taylor, 2003 and 
2004). According to this literature, richer countries, which have higher demands for 
environmental quality, tend to impose more stringent environmental regulations in order to abate 
pollution. Pollution abatement, however, imposing extra costs on domestic firms, affects 
international competitiveness, eventually reversing comparative advantages and inducing dirty 
sectors to concentrate in poorer countries with weaker environmental standards (pollution 
havens).  
 
Models of environmental policy and technological change, in turn, have been mainly developed 
in closed economy frameworks where pollution is treated either as a complementary input (Ricci, 
2007) or as a pure production externality (Peretto, 2008). In both cases pollution abatement 
(induced by taxation) imposes a trade-off between technological change directed to productivity 
improvements and technological progress directed to pollution abatement. Shifting resources 
from the former to the latter tend to reduce long-run growth, which, nonetheless, remains 
sustainable thanks to technological progress in pollution abatement.  
 
There are very few models that link the three aspects, trade, endogenous technological change 
and environmental regulation and, resembling the closed economy frameworks, also in these 
cases pollution is considered solely as an outcome of production (see for example Di Maria and 6 
 
Smulders, 2004) . The aim of this paper is to extend the literature on endogenous technological 
change to consider the case of pollution as a by-product of consumption and to assess the 
spillover effects of a unilateral green tax on consumption when two countries with different 
environmental regulations trade between them. The ultimate goal is to feed into the current 
debate on the effectiveness of policy actions to abate pollution undertaken in isolation in a non-
cooperative globalized world.  
 
To this end, I propose a general equilibrium model of trade, pollution and technological change 
borrowing from the cited literature. There are two regions North (N) and South (S), both regions 
produce a differentiated set of polluting consumption goods. I start from the assumption that the 
richer region (N) has environmental concerns and wishes to abate pollution, while the poorer one 
has not such a concern (S). If, in order to abate pollution, N imposes a unilateral tax on domestic 
production it would impose an extra cost on domestic firms, thereby undermining their 
international competitiveness. In order to eliminate such a trade-off I consider pollution as a by-
product of consumption and I propose to study the effects of a unilateral green tax on 
consumption. A Tax on domestic consumption of polluting goods by shifting the burden on 
consumers, would affect the demand schedule for goods according to their pollution intensity, 
regardless of where those goods are produced. As a result world consumption and production of 
polluting goods are reduced unless technological change compensates.  
 
As in previous works (Di Maria and Smulders, 2004, Peretto, 2008 and Ricci, 2007), I suppose 
that R&D is directed to two sorts of innovations: pollution abatement and cost-reducing 
innovations. Goods that meet higher environmental standards will have a larger market share in 7 
 
the northern region. Pollution abatement is obtained by relocating resources to R&D. The model 
shows that: (a) if trade must be balanced, then the northern region can impose a green tax on 
consumption as long as its income is large enough; (b) as the green tax affects both profits and 
the terms of trade it can spur innovation in both countries; (c) pollution levels might be 
permanently reduced in both regions. 
 
The assumption that the social cost of pollution can be internalized by taxing consumption relies 
on both, empirical and theoretical considerations and requires a brief discussion. On the 
empirical ground, Milito and Gagnon (2008) show that in mature economies, such as Canada, 
households’ consumption generates, both directly, through direct consumption of fuel (motor 
fuel and residential fuel), and indirectly, through the emissions resulting from the production of 
goods and services purchased, about half of the total national greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, 
although pollution due to consumption is certainly not exhaustive, it could tackle half of the 
problem bringing to the attention the role of taxation in shifting consumption towards more 
sustainable products, eventually accelerating the introduction of new technologies (Albrect, 
2006).  
 
On the theoretical ground, the political economy literature has recently shown that in open 
economy a regulator captured by polluting industries can more easily abate pollution by 
regulating consumer-generated emissions (McAusland, 2008 and Schleich, 1999). As domestic 
and foreign goods will be affected in the same fashion according to their pollution intensities, we 
could further argue that this kind of unilateral action can indeed overcome free-riding and carbon 
leakage problems.  8 
 
 
The literature on trade and the environment generally considers economies with two sectors, a 
dirty and a clean sector, and uses taxation to shift production from the former to the latter within 
national boundaries, eventually reversing international specialization (Copeland and Taylor, 
1995 and 2003). This means that in this framework there is no guarantee that the direction of 
technological change is towards pollution abatement in dirty sectors. In fact, when countries 
have different environmental standards, polluting emissions from production or consumption are 
eventually reduced where standards are more stringent but increased elsewhere, where standards 
are lower. On the contrary, here, by taxing consumption, pollution is internalized no matter 
where the goods are produced, somewhat leveling the playing field and impacting worldwide 
pollution and technological change. However, for such an action to be successful the market size 
is crucial, in that only a large regulated market can offer sizeable incentives to invest in 
abatement technologies thereby inducing pollution abatement worldwide. 
 
The paper does not concern optimal environmental taxation; rather its aim is to show, by means 
of a simplified general equilibrium model, that it is indeed possible to produce positive spillovers 
in terms of world pollution, technological change and welfare by unilaterally imposing a green 
tax on consumption. In this respect the contribution of the paper to the existing literature is 
twofold. Firstly, to my knowledge, this is the first attempt to model pollution as a by-product of 
consumption within an endogenous growth framework with international trade, and, secondly, as 
a result of that, the first time in which it is possible to analyze the effects of a unilateral 
environmental policy action overcoming the trade-off between unilateral abatement policies and 
international competitiveness of domestic firms.  9 
 
 
The paper is organized as follow: section 2 describes the model and the equilibrium. Section 3 
describes the government policy and computes the balanced growth path. Section 4 presents the 
model’s implications for world pollution. Section 5 discusses welfare. Section 6 concludes.      
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Pollution. We consider a two-country world: North (N) and South (S). Each economy is 
populated by a finite number of identical firms, Ii ( i=N, S), which produce differentiated 
consumption goods in monopolistic competition. The number of goods is fixed. All the goods are 
traded between the two countries, trade is balanced and there are no transportation costs. 
Households in the two countries love variety and wish to consume all the available varieties, 
domestic firms produce IN goods, foreign firms IS, therefore the total number of consumption 
goods is I= IN + IS.  
 
At time   each unit of good j (j=1…, IN + IS) consumed produces a level of pollution    
  , where 
    is the stock of pollution abatement technology embedded in good j at time   and  ,0      
1, is the elasticity of pollution abatement. Aggregate pollution in region i at time    is: 
      ∑    
     
       
                                                                                                                         (1)  
   
   is the quantity of j-th good consumed by the representative household in region i. Pollution is 
local and can be reduced either by reducing    
   or by increasing    . We assume that pollution is 
a concern only for the citizens in the richer northern region. To abate pollution, the northern 10 
 
government imposes a green tax on consumption proportional to the pollution intensity of each 
good:  
         
   
   
         
  ;                                                                                                               (2) 
    is the tax rate on the j-th good at time  .
1 
 
2.2 Consumption. At time   the representative household in N maximizes utility over an infinite 
horizon  
                      ∑     
  
       
  1  
1/ 
                
∞
    ,                                                      (3) 
0   1 ;0   1 . 
Subject to a dynamic budget constraint 
                                     . 
Households have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over the diversified consumption goods    
   and get 
disutility from the damages caused by aggregate pollution (      ); however, they do not 
internalize their contribution to it. BN is asset holdings, the dot indicate time derivative, i.e.  
        /     ,     is the interest rate, LN is the labor force, in fixed supply, wN is the wage rate. 
Assets and labor do not move across countries, therefore, remunerations are country specific. GN 
are government transfers (green tax revenues are rebated lump sum to northern citizens) and YN is 
consumption expenditure,       ∑     
          
      
       
  1 ;    
  is the price of good j in country N 
at time  .  
                                                 
1 The assumption that the southern region has no environmental concerns is a simplification used here to stress the 
need of a unilateral policy action. More in general, the question of whether and why poorer countries tend to have 
lower environmental concerns is usually addressed in the literature by means of the “environmental Kuznets curve” 
hypothesis (Copeland and Taylor, 2004).  Also, here we do not consider transboundary pollution to keep the analysis 
as simple as possible; nonetheless, as the green tax on consumption has the potential to reduce pollution per unit of 
consumption in both regions, this policy turns out to be even more beneficial in the case of transboundary pollution. 11 
 
 
In S the government levies no taxes, hence, GS=0. Households have same preferences as in N for 
consumption but do not care about pollution, therefore, they maximize  
                      ∑     
   
       




    ,                                                                               (3’) 
s.t.                                ; with       ∑    
     
       
  1 . 
Where    
  and    
   are, respectively, the quantity consumed and the price of good j in S, all the 
other variables have the same meaning as before and the subscript S indicates that they refer to 
region S. All the values are expressed in a common currency which grows at the rate of growth 
of world tradable output.  
 
Households’ maximization in N and S yields the following demand functions for good j:  
   
       
    
        
   
  /     
∑     
        
   
  /           
   
 .                                                                                            (4) 
 
   
       
    
   
  /     
∑     
   
  /           
   
 .                                                                                                         (5) 
1/ 1     >1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties, the elasticity with 
respect to income is one. Households’ optimal expenditure plans also require the Euler equation 
to hold in each country, therefore, suppressing the time subscript for simplicity, we have: 
   
  
         .                                                                                                                                   (6) 
 
The growth rate of expenditures is equal to the difference between the interest rate r and the 
subjective discount rate,  . 
  12 
 
2.3 Production. Each differentiated good is produced using labor and firm-specific know-how:  
           
      .                                                                                                                              (7) 
    is the knowledge stock of process innovations of firm j in country i which determines labor 
productivity.
2 Firms operate in Bertrand’s monopolistic competition and, as they face different 
demand functions in the two countries, they can price discriminate. Each firm maximizes profits: 
max    
 ,   
    Π         
    
       
     
           
      
       
                                      (8) 
 s.t. 
   
   
       
        
   
  /     
∑     
        
   
  /           
   
  and    
   
       
   
  /     
∑     
   
  /           
   
 . 
Maximization yields the following pricing strategy: 
 ̂  
   
       
               
  
  .                                                                                                             (9) 
 ̂  
   
       
  
  .                                                                                                                                (10) 
Firms set the price equal to a fixed mark-up over the marginal cost. In N differentiated goods are 
sold for a higher unit price compared to S. The green tax, in fact, acts as if firms face higher 
marginal costs when selling the good in N. The higher the pollution intensity, the lower the 
demand and the higher the price charged in N for that good.  
 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that firms are symmetric within each region, but not 
between them. Therefore we set      
 
  
∑          
  
     and      
 
  
∑          
  
    ; that is, cost 
reducing and pollution abatement technologies associated to each good are equal to the region’s 
average levels. By increasing     the average labor productivity in region i increases and by 
                                                 
2 Here process innovations can be interpreted either as quality improvements or as cost reductions (for a discussion 
on this topic see Acemoglu, 2009). 13 
 
increasing     the average pollution intensity of consumption goods produced in region i declines, 
A and Z can be increased only through costly R&D activities, as it will be discussed later on. 
From now on, using the symmetry assumption, the generic subscript j that refers to single firms 
can be dropped and replaced with the subscript i that refers to countries (i=N,S). 
 
In order to pin down the wage rate, we assume that in each country there exists a wage setting 
agreement such that wages are linked to the average domestic labor productivity in the X sector; 
that is,           
  
   and           
  
  , where 0      1 . Without loss of generality, we can 
further assume that the two shares are the same across the two countries, and set them equal to 
c.
3     
 
Using the fact that firms are symmetric within each country, we can write the maximum level of 
profits of a typical firm j in N as:  
π       
     
  
    
           
      ,                                                                                                  (11) 
where     
   
           
  
     /     
           
  
     /                 
  
     /      and   
   
  
     
 are the market shares in 
value terms; also, by the symmetry assumption, we replaced     with    , as now the green tax 
can be thought as specific to the country in which each consumption good is produced. As    
   
increases (decreases) when      (    ) increases, 
       
      
 0   (
       
      
 0 ).  
 
                                                 
3 The need of a wage setting mechanism is justified by the fact that in this model does not exist the traditional 
perfectly competitive sector that produces an international traded good that, used as numeraire, can pin down 
relative wages. As we assume here constant returns to scale from labor in all sectors, labor productivity and income 
distribution are independent from the size and the allocation of the labor force, hence, this assumption on the wage 
setting agreement while rather innocuous, helps to solve easily the model.   14 
 
2.4 Balanced trade and market clearing conditions. Trade must be balanced, therefore we 
have: 
     
   
  
 
       
     
  .                                                                                                                  (12) 
Where    
   is the price charged in S by firms located in country N. By the symmetry assumption, this 
is true for all firms j      1…,    located in country N. Similarly    
   is the price charged in N by all 
firms located in country S. Using (4), (5), (9), (10) and the definition of   
  and   
 , balanced trade 
implies: 
      
   
          
             1      
   .                                                                                               (13) 
Where, using again the symmetry assumption,            
  
  , for all firms j located in country i. 
Since 
          
         <1 in order for (13) to hold it must be that 
   




     
  , that is N’s expenditure 
must be relatively large, and precisely, it must be larger than the relative value of the market 
shares in the foreign market.  
 
The labor market clearing condition states that labor force in country i must be totally employed 
in production (    ) and research (    ), omitting the time subscripts we have: 
                                                                                                                                           (14) 
For brevity, let us concentrate on N. The market clearing condition for goods in country N is: 
    
  
      
  
          
        
   .                                                                                                      (15) 
     
   indicates region’s i demand for each variety produced in country N in equilibrium. 
Combining (14) and (15) and inserting (9) and (10) into (4) and (5), respectively, we have:  
  
  
         
  
 
       
 
           
      
 
   
.                                                                                              (16) 15 
 
 Then, combining (13) and (16) we find the allocation of labor between sectors compatible with 
the resource constraint (RC): 
       
  
 
    
    
  
   
   
 
     
 
          
     
 1      
    .                                                                       (17) 
As    
  decreases when HN increases, given YN, (17) implies that the proportion of workers 
employed in production decreases as the green tax increases. 
Similarly in S we have: 
       
  
 
    
    
  
   
  
 
          
   1    
   .                                                                                   (17’) 
As   
  is independent of the green tax, given    , an increase in HS, tends univocally to reduce the 
proportion of workers employed in production in S. 
 
2.5 Technological change. To simplify the analysis we assume that the R&D activity is done 
only by outsiders.
4 The R&D process is cumulative, building on the know-how of existing 
goods. Technology does not diffuse freely, domestic R&D labs which hold domestic know-how 
can only improve domestic technology. In each country there are as many labs as the number of 
varieties produced domestically. A Firm wishing to produce a specific diversified consumption 
good buys the license to produce with the latest available technology. The firm that uses the 
latest technology in sector j retains a monopoly right to produce the j-th consumption good at 
that technological level until the next generation of technology arrives. Innovations replace 
completely older vintages.
5 The adoption and diffusion of technologies are guaranteed by free 
                                                 
4 Such an assumption would be a natural outcome if incumbents and entrants have the same technology for 
innovation.  
5 In presence of Bertrand competition, the innovation is drastic if the marginal cost of the incumbent is greater than 
the unconstrained monopoly price of entrants, which, absent the green tax is equal to 
 
 . We assume that such a 
condition is satisfied so that entrants can charge the unconstrained monopolist price. 16 
 
entry.
6 To simplify the analysis, as in Ricci (2007) we assume that each innovation improves 
both A and Z.
7 More investment in R&D reduces the length of monopoly profits but at the same 
time increases productivity and reduces the pollution intensity of consumption goods with a 
positive impact on demand and profits. Technology is improved upon by employing researchers 
in the labs, the flow of innovations in sector j in a time interval of length     is        , where 
     is the number of workers employed in the j-th R&D lab, and 0<λ<1. Using the symmetry 
assumption of firms within each country, we specify the law of motion for A and Z as the 
following: 
      
                    ;             1. 
(18) 
    
                   ;      0       1. 
 A dot over a variable indicates the derivative with respect to time.    and   are the shares of 
R&D workers that in each lab is devoted to cost-reducing and emission-reducing innovations, 
respectively, therefore     1 . Constant returns to knowledge accumulation support long-run 
growth. In order to eliminate strong scale effects from the model, we assume that in each region 
the number of firms is equal to the population size, that is, Ii=Li.
8 If we define the share of the 
                                                 
6 The replacement effect is at work. Of course, it would be more realistic to assume that R&D is done in-house by 
incumbents; such an assumption would allow us to study the market structure as the outcome of the interplay 
between incumbents and entrants (Peretto, 2008 and Acemoglu, 2009). However, in a two country model the 
analysis would get immediately complicated (see Marconi, 2007) and since our aim here is to draw first conclusions 
on the spillovers of a unilateral environmental policy, we want to keep the model as simple as possible. 
7 Such an assumption is indeed required. In fact, for long-run growth to be sustainable technical progress in 
pollution abatement technology is necessary. Given the symmetry of firms, as entrants replace incumbents on the 
basis of a better technology, A or Z, on the same product line, they will do so once improvements are achieved on 
both dimensions. Under this assumption, we are ruling out the possibility that firms with older technologies can 
survive by serving the unregulated market, which makes even more important to stress the importance of the size of 
the market where polluting emissions are regulated. For further interpretation and justification of the assumption in 
case of non-symmetric firms in closed economy see Ricci (2007), note 11 p. 292. 
8 This assumption can be derived from models such as Peretto (1998), where in equilibrium the number of firms is 
proportional to the size of the labor force. For a discussion of the scale effect see Jones (2005).   17 
 
labor force employed in production as       
   
  
 and that employed in R&D as      1     , we 
then have: 
   
  
    
           . 
(18’) 
   
  
    
           . 
 
2.6 The free-entry and general equilibrium. By investing an amount of resources equal to 
       an innovator in the product line j produces a flow of innovations equal to (              in 
the period         , which allows her to sell the license to a new entrant to replace the existing 
monopolist in that product line, therefore gaining the value of the firm,          . Hence, the free-
entry condition requires an innovator to maximize: 
max                              .                                                                                              (19) 
 
Maximization then implies:  
 
              ;                                                  0 . (20)                        
Meaning that, the entry cost, equal to the marginal cost of an innovation, must equal the value of 
the firm if entry is positive. 
 
Domestic capital markets are perfectly competitive and capital does not move internationally. 
The traditional no-arbitrage condition between alternative investment opportunities must hold in 
both countries. Along the balanced growth path we know from the Euler equation (6) that the 
interest rate must be constant, therefore, the equilibrium on the capital market for      0 
requires: 18 
 
                             
             
         
          
           
     .                                                                                          (21)                                
Equation (21) states that the return on any stock must equal the return on an equal size 
investment in riskless bonds; therefore, the capitalized value of the firm must be equal to the 
flow of profits (plus capital gains) minus the losses that occur when the incumbent is replaced by 
a new entrant (which happens at the flow rate      ).
9  
Rearranging (21) and dropping time subscripts for brevity, in each country we have: 
    
   
               
   
   
.                                                                                                            (22) 
Imposing the free entry condition  
    
   
 
     
  
 , i=N, S; and the symmetry condition we have: 
     
  
        
   
  
 
   
  
 .                                                                                                          (23) 
From the wage setting behavior we know that: 
         
 
  and          
 
                                                                                                            (24) 
therefore: 
     
  
  
   
 
   
 and  
     
  
  
   
 
   
                                                                                      (25) 
The growth rate of wages depends on the growth rate of the average firm’s know how in the 
home country.   
                                                 
9 The trasversality condition requires: lim                 
 
   ∑    , , |   ,    
  
      0 .  19 
 
Inserting (11), (13), (24) and (25) into (23) and using the Euler’s equation (6) and the fact that 
along the balanced growth path the growth rate of wages must equal that of expenditures, we can 
write the no-arbitrage condition for a typical firm who wish to enter in N as: 
     
       
   
 
   
   
   
         
    
 1     
     
 
 .                                                                           (26) 
Similarly in S we have: 
     
       
   
 
   
 
    
         
  
     1   
     
 
 .                                                                           (26’) 
Equations (26) and (26’) give the allocation of workers between production and R&D 
compatible with labor, goods and capital market clearing conditions in the two countries. In N 
the relationship between the green tax and the proportion of workers employed in R&D is in 
principle uncertain because, while the terms of trade exert a negative effect, (holding constant 
  
 , the second term in the square bracket of (26) decreases as HS increases), expenditures, in 
turn, exert a positive effect; in fact, when Hi  increases YN increases as well.
10 In S, instead, YS 
and   
  are not affected by the green tax, while the terms of trade is positively affected (see the 
first term in the square bracket of (26’)). Therefore, from (26’) we find that in S the green tax 
univocally tends to increase the proportion of workers employed in R&D. To find out the general 
equilibrium along the balanced growth path we need, therefore, to establish the tax strategy of 
the government in N.  
 
   
                                                 
10 The proof is available from the author upon request. 20 
 
3. Green tax revenues and balanced growth path 
 
Let us now turn our attention to the government policy. The government in setting the green tax 
can make different choices, however not all of them are compatible with a balanced growth path. 
Total revenues for the government are                
              
 . By using demand functions 
(4), price equations (9) and (10), and the definition of    
  , revenues can be written as: 
            
   
          
   
   
        1      
    .                                                                            (27) 
It is easy to see that the only policy compatible with balanced growth path is the one that lets    
grow at the same rate of domestic expenditures, and this, in turn, requires keeping constant over 
time the whole quantity in the square bracket of (27). Hence the government must set      
     0 , that is, it must keep constant the revenues per unit of consumption of both domestic and 
foreign goods over time. Such a policy implies that   
  is constant over time and the tax rates 
adjust to the change in pollution intensities, that is, 
   
  
  
   
   ; if pollution intensities are abated at 
different speeds then the two tax rates must grow at different rates.
11  
 
Inserting (27) into the household’s budget constraint, solving for     and substituting back into 
(26) we get the balanced growth path (BGP) share of workers in R&D and the long-run growth 
rate:
 12 
   
   
                     
            .                                                                         (28) 
                                                 








    




   
   
  
 
   
  
 , hence, 
   
  
 
   
  
   
   
  
 
   
  
 . Therefore, if  
   
  
  
   
  
, then 
   
  
  
   
  
. 
12 The proof is available from the author upon request. 21 
 
  
   
                         
         .                                                                    (29)  
Where     
  
        
   
  
       1     
  ;        
     
         
    
  1     




   
   
              
   .                                                                                      (30) 
  
         1    ρ λ  Ψ   ρ  .                                                                   (31) 
 Ψ   
    
         
  
     1    
  . 
When          0  then     0  and          1 . When          0  then  0      
 
     
1,  0         
     
        
      1     
   1 , and 
  
              
   
          
     1    
    1 . 
   represents the saving push induced in N by government revenues, which tend to increase the 
share of workers allocated in R&D in N;    and   , in turn, capture the terms of trade effects. 
Such an effect, being negative for N, reduces   , thereby shifting workers away from the R&D 
sector, towards the production sector; on the contrary, this effect being positive in S, increases 
  , shifting workers towards the R&D sector there. Also note that the larger the relative size of 
N, that is, the larger   
 , which under the BGP government policy is equal to   
 , the larger are 
both Ψ  and Ψ . The following proposition summarizes these findings. 
Proposition 1. Suppose the government sets          0 .  As 
  
         Ψ    1 ,  the green tax 
univocally increases the BGP proportion of workers allocated to R&D in both countries. In the 
South the positive terms of trade effect always guarantees this result. In the North, instead, as 
two opposite forces are at work, a positive push on savings generated by government revenues, 
and a negative effect on savings generated by the worsening of the terms of trade, the BGP 22 
 
allocation of workers between the two sectors depends on which one of these two effects prevails. 
In the case of          0  the saving push effect prevails. Moreover, the larger the relative size 
of N, the market that regulates, the larger the saving push effect in N and the positive terms of 
trade effect in S, and, therefore, the higher the proportion of workers allocated to R&D in both 
countries.   
A numerical example based on the values reported in table 1 confirms that for some combination 
of parameters and initial conditions the green tax on consumption has indeed the potential to 
increase the proportion of workers employed in R&D in both regions (fig.1), inducing a higher 
rate of pollution abatement innovations in both regions.   
Table 1: Initial conditions and parameters for numerical example 
                                            
150  100  2  1,5  20  15 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5  0.5  0.03
 
 
Fig. 1. BGP optimal allocation of workers to R&D, for different initial tax rates  





4. Aggregate pollution 
 
We now turn our attention to aggregate pollution in both regions. We indicate with   
  the 
aggregate pollution in region i when the green tax is in place (H>0) and with   
  the pollution 
level when the green tax is zero (H=0) and with a single asterisk BGP levels when H>0 and a 
double asterisk the BGP levels when H=0. Along the BGP aggregate pollution will be: 
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Proposition 2. As long as    
          
   are sufficiently smaller than    
  , a unilateral green tax 
on consumption can reduce pollution in both countries, that is    
       
   and     
       
 , and 
can stay lower forever, provided that the pro-growth effect of the green tax does not exceed the 
pollution dumping effect.  
 
Using the same initial conditions and parameters shown in table 1, we find that the level of 
pollution, though still increasing over time, is permanently reduced in both countries and 
therefore worldwide. 
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Fig. 2 – World pollution along the BGP when the rate is zero for all consumption goods 




If the elasticity of pollution abatement,  , is sufficiently large, then the level of pollution might 
even be constant or decreasing over time and still lower when H>0.  
 
It is worth noting that the pro-growth effect of the green tax arises from the fact that the 
proportion of R&D expenditures devoted to the two types of innovations is fixed, so, once 
resources are shifted from production to R&D, the flow rate of innovation increases for both, A 
and Z. However, such a simplification does not undermine the main result delivered by the 
model, that is, there exists a positive spillover effect on pollution abatement in the South. 
     
5. Welfare 
 
Suppose the two economies are along the balanced growth path and consider the case        . 
The instantaneous utility functions derived from (3) and (3’) are: 25 
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To compare welfare under the two policy regimes let denote as before with a single asterisk the 
BGP levels when H>0 and with a double asterisk BGP levels when H=0. Dropping the time 
subscripts for brevity, at a given moment in time, the difference between the utility indexes 
under the two regimes in N and S will be given by: 
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The first term on the right hand side of equation (37) indicates the negative effect on 
consumption exerted by the green tax in N; however, since by proposition 1 when the green tax 
is in place the BGP share of workers allocated to R&D is higher, it follows that   
      
   and 
  
      
  , hence the sum of the other three terms in (37) is positive. Therefore, provided that H 
is not too large, welfare in N can be higher when H>0 compared to the case in which H=0. As 
shown by (37’), in S welfare is always higher when H>0; in fact, by the terms of trade effect, 
wealth is increased so that the region can enjoy both the same level of consumption and a higher 
rate of productivity growth compared to the case of H=0. We conclude therefore, that:  
Proposition 3. A unilateral green tax on consumption can improve welfare and increase the rate 
of productivity growth and pollution abatement in both regions.  
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We can also compare the market equilibrium allocation with the socially efficient allocation of 
workers. We assume that households in N recognize pollution as a bad but do not internalize 
their contribution to it. On the contrary, the government internalizes such a contribution and 
specializes the households’ damage function as           ∑     
    
   
       
     
 / 
. Hence, the 
government in N maximizes the following social welfare function (     ): 
max
   
  
 
                      
       ∑     
  
       
     
 / 
         ∑     
    
   
       
     
 / 
   ;    (38)    
 
subject to the technology constraint (7), the market clearing constraints (12), (14) and (15) and 
the low of motions (18’). Solving the social planner problem we find the social optimal 
allocation of workers between the two sectors. If the social optimal share of workers in R&D is 
larger than the decentralized market equilibrium’s one, the government can find the level of H 
that sets the two equal. To simplify the calculations, let us consider the case of symmetric 
countries. In this case the social optimal share of workers to be employed in R&D is given by:    
  
     
                 
               .
13                                                                                                       (39) 
The superscript SP indicates that (39) is the social planner optimal allocation. We can now 
compare (39) with the market optimal allocation when countries are symmetric and H=0 (call it 
MD):  
  
      
         
  .                                                                                                                      (40) 
The social optimal proportion of workers employed in R&D, given by (39), might be larger or 
smaller than the market allocation, given by (40), depending on the parameters of the economy.
14 
                                                 
13 The derivation is available from the author upon request. 
14 In the case of Shumpeterian endogenous growth model it might be possible that the market equilibrium leads to 
too much investment in R&D than the social optimum would require. In general this happens if the appropriability 
effect is lower than the business stealing effect (Acemoglu, 2009). In our case, however, more considerations need to 27 
 
For example, using the numbers reported in table 1 and setting   0 . 1 , we find that the social 
planner optimum would be equal to 0.63, which is larger than the decentralized one, equal to 
0.45; in such a case the government can reach the social optimum by setting H at the level that 
sets the two shares equal. 
6. Conclusion 
 
Climate policies have become a major issue in the agenda of policymakers worldwide, in 
recognition of the global threat posed by global warming and climate change. The industrialized 
world is considered the main responsible for global warming to date and it is asked to take the 
lead in implementing mitigation policies (Giddens, 2009). However, unilateral actions in a 
globalized world are opposed on the basis of competitiveness concerns, free-riding behaviors and 
carbon-leakage considerations. Competitiveness concerns stem from the fact that greenhouse gas 
emissions are primarily seen as a by-product of production. In such a case unilateral actions in 
pollution abatement would impose additional costs on domestic firms, likely causing a simple 
relocation of production and polluting emissions in countries with lower environmental standards 
(carbon leakage in pollution havens).  
 
By shifting the attention from pollution as a by-product of production to pollution as a by-
product of consumption, in this paper we show that, indeed, a unilateral green tax on 
consumption could overcome competitiveness and carbon leakage problems, rising welfare and 
abating pollution worldwide. This outcome is precisely the result of the fact that a green tax on 
                                                                                                                                                             
be done: on the one side, the value of R&D is not fully appreciated by the market since innovations that improve the 
pollution abatement technology is not really valued until the government introduces a pollution tax, on the other 
side, though, by increasing the proportion of labor force employed in R&D the long-run growth rate increases as 
well, counteracting the pollution abatement effect, therefore the social planner must balance these two effects. The 
other major difference between the social planner solution and the decentralized one is in that in the former R&D is 
equivalent to an in-house activity, whereas in the latter only outsiders do it, hence the steady state expressions look 
very different.      28 
 
consumption affects both domestic and import prices in the same fashion. For such an action to 
be successful however market size is essential, in that only a large and rich market can offer the 
right incentives to invest in new technologies affecting world innovation and pollution 
abatement.  
 
These results, even though obtained within a very stylized model, highlight that taxes on 
consumption, and consumption behavior more in general, should deserve more attention in the 
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